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In this paper we show that it is possible to manipulate market equilibria in an economy 
with profit maximizing agents (or exchange economies with quasi-linear utilities and 
hence interest free money as a means of transfer among agents) by either destroying or 
withholding ones initial endowments. Example 1 of this paper is an instance of a very 
simple economy, where every competitive extended allocation is vulnerable to 
manipulation via both misrepresentation of productive capabilities as well as destruction 
or withholding of endowments. 
 
 
1. Introduction: The most well known solution prescribed by modern economic theory for 
decentralized allocation of resources is Walrasian equilirium. Agents are initially 
endowed with non-negative quantities of resources and are assumed to engage in 
mutually compatible exchanges, after maximizing utility or preferences subject to a 
budget constraint. The budget constraint that an agent faces in such problems imposes a 
liquidity constraint on their transactions. The Pareto Optimality of such solutions make 
them very appealing both as prescriptive and descriptive models of market behavior. 
Campbell (1987) contains a contemporary discussion of issues related to the Walrasian 
mechanism.  
The Walrasian mechanism of resource allocation suffers from severe incentive problems. 
The possibility of an agent being able to improve itself by misrepresenting its 
preferences, has often been cited as the main drawback of the Walrasian solution. 
However, if the Walrasian solution were to depend on an agent’s ability to compute an 
optimal solution to a constrained optimization problem, then its applicability as a solution 
in resource allocation problems would be rather suspect. It is unreasonable to assume that 
market participants are or should be equipped with the necessary mathematical expertise 
to enter into mutually compatible trades, in much the same way as the knowledge of 
partial differential equations is superfluous for being able to ride a bicycle. Further, the 
issue of misrepresenting individual preferences, rests on (i) the realization of an 
economic environment allowing such a misrepresentation; (ii) the agent who stands from 
the deviation being aware of such a possibility as also of the entire profile of preferences 
and initial endowments. This latter information being prohibitive and dispersed among 
the agents, adds to the computational complexity of the exercise of preference 
misrepresentation. Thus, while the problem of preference misrepresentation is surely a 
  1theoretical possibility, the sheer computational complexity of the entire exercise makes 
the threat posed by it somewhat unlikely. 
A more likely possibility is that an agent may tamper around with its available 
endowments, in order to secure an improvement in welfare for itself. Non-disclosure or 
false disclosure of taxable income is an extremely common phenomenon that 
governments often need to deal with. While money income is not the same as a bundle of 
goods initially endowed with an agent, they are related concepts. In any event, 
misrepresentation of ones physical assets for accounting or tax purposes, is not 
uncommon either. The question that naturally arises is the following: Is it possible to 
manipulate the Walrasian mechanism by either destroying or withholding a portion of 
ones initial endowment? The answer to this question is in the affirmative, as shown in 
Postlewaite (1979). In fact Postlewaite (1979) contains the more general result that any 
social choice mechanism in the pure exchange setting which satisfies Pareto Optimality 
and individual rationality is manipulable via endowments.      
What concerns us here is the ability of a producer to influence prices by taking into 
consideration the effects of its decision on demand or supply. “The activities of the 
OPEC oil cartel have made a commonplace phenomenon, that of a group of producers 
withholding or destroying part of their output, even better known” (:Campbell (1987)). 
However, a producer in economic theory is assumed to maximize profits instead of utility 
subject to a budget constraint. A paradigm shift is thus required if agents are assumed to 
behave like profit maximizing producers and not like budget constrained consumers. The 
market clearing equilibrium price quantity configuration that now emerges is referred to 
here as a market equilibrium. Agents are equipped with concave production function, 
which converts bundles of inputs that the economy is initially endowed with, into a 
numeraire consumption good. The market prices of the inputs are measured in terms of 
this numeraire consumption good. Market equilibrium obtains when the total quantity of 
each input demanded is equal to its total availability within the economy. Sun and Yang 
(2004) show, that every such economy admits market equilibrium, when the inputs are 
divisible and under a max-convolution preservability property when the inputs are 
available in integer amounts only. 
The assumption that technology available with a producer is usually common knowledge 
is certainly not one that can be made without reservations. However, the possibility of 
technology being more amenable to public scrutiny than individual preferences cannot be 
completely ruled out either. Hence misrepresenting the technology available with a 
producer, is less likely to succeed than preference misrepresentation, if at all. Thus, while 
the arguments concerning computational complexity may have less “bite” when the 
agents are profit maximizing producers, public knowledge about the technical capabilities 
of a producer, make misrepresentation of ones production function an unlikely 
possibility. On the other hand, the possibility of gaining by misrepresenting or 
manipulating ones initial endowments, remains and once again is not very uncommon in 
the real world. For manufacturing firms manipulation via endowments is especially 
problematic as firms can keep inputs idle or destroy them or not sell them on the market. 
We will show that a single productive agent can do this in a way that influences prices to 
its advantage. The difference between our analysis and that of Postlewaite (1979) is that 
we show that market equilibrium is manipulable via destroying as well as withholding 
initial endowments, whereas they exhibited a similar manipulability for solutions which 
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Postlewaite (1979) would require each agent to produce at least as much as it could by 
using its own initial endowment. A market equilibrium allocation is easily verified to be 
Pareto Optimal. However, the assumption that agents are profit maximizers, fails to 
guarantee that a market equilibrium is individually rational. This is what prevents us from 
obtaining our result as a consequence of the results established by Postlewaite (1979). 
Our results are shown to be valid both when the inputs are perfectly divisible as well as 
when they are available in integer units only. 
While the model that we consider here is a static one, it has some connection with the 
problem with hoarding. While hoarding is primarily a dynamic problem, manipulation 
via endowment is an approximation of such a phenomenon in the static context. 
In a recent paper Atlamaz and Klaus (2005), consider exchange markets with 
heterogeneous indivisible goods and investigate the possibility of exchange rules that are 
efficient and immune to manipulation via endowments. They consider manipulability 
either with respect to withholding or destroying part of the initial endowment or 
transferring part of the endowment to another trader. They show that in general no 
exchange rule exists which is both efficient and immune to manipulation via 
endowments. 
It is a well known fact that Walrasian equilibria in pure exchange contexts, exhibit what 
is known as the “transfer paradox”, where an agent can benefit by transferring some of its 
initial endowment to another agent. A stronger result noted by Gale (1974) and 
subsequently established for strictly convex economies by Aumann and Peleg (1974), is 
that it is possible for a non-empty proper subset comprising at least two agents to 
reallocate their initial endowments within the subset and then trade to a new Walrasian 
equilibrium where each and every member of the redistributing coalition is better off than 
at the Walrasian equilibrium associated with the original initial endowments. The core 
compatibilty of Walrasian equilibrium would imply that at the new Walrasian 
equilibrium, the aggregate consumption of the redistributing coalition exceeds its 
aggregate initial endowment for at least one commodity. Goenka and Matta (2005), 
examine the underlying uncertainty inherent in the formation of redistributing coalitions 
and the consequent extrinsic uncertainty that it implies for the economy. They show that 
under certain conditions, self-improving redistributing coalitions can form if and only 
extrinsic uncertainty is significant for the economy, i.e. sunspots matter. Clearly such 
paradoxes are ruled out, once we consider market equilibria with profit maximizing 
agents as in our model. 
It may be wondered whether the phenomena we are concerned with in this paper, is 
specific to the example that we have provided, or can be extended beyond its narrow 
confines. To answer this question it might be instructive to note that individual profit 
entails equating “marginal productivity” of the agents to the price of the input. The 
change in price that follows as a result of manipulation via endowments, is determined by 
the availability of the respective marginal productivities in the production function of the 
agents. This would allow us to accommodate within our framework of manipulation via 
endowments a considerably larger class of production functions, which share the same 
marginal productivities as the production function in our example, at the desired 
allocations. Even otherwise, constancy of marginal productivities within a certain 
interval, is not counter intuitive. Hence, the production function that we use can be 
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However, all this involves avoidable complication, in so far as the main goal of this paper 
is concerned. 
The manipulability results that we obtain here are not meant to be surprising at all. In fact 
the analysis reported here reflects a common threat to the smooth delivery of the market 
mechanism, as we have already indicated above. In a finite economy everyone has a little 
bit of monopoly power, which is often exercised by manipulating one’s endowments. 
This gets translated in an enhancement of the scarcity value of the commodity in 
question, leading to a price rise. The interesting point that the existing literature 
highlights is that (and without speculating on what would be the consequences in a 
continuum artifact) in a finite competitive economy this effect is very small. 
What perhaps is noteworthy about the phenomena we discuss here is the vulnerability of 
the competitive mechanism to manipulation via endowments, even when the agents are 
profit maximizers. This corresponds to the situation in a pure exchange economy, where 
agent’s preferences are represented by quasi-linear preferences, and every agent can lend 
and borrow money at zero interest rate. In such economies, unlike Postlewaite (1979), it 
is not possible to show that every individually rational and efficient “extended” allocation 
is manipulable via endowments. In fact the dictatorial “extended” efficient allocation, 
where all but one agent consumes the output of its initial endowment, and this one agent 
i.e. the dictator, skims away the entire surplus from the other agents, is individually 
rational and efficient without being manipulable via destruction or withholding of 
endowments. Hence, the possibility of being able to manipulate market equilibrium via 
destruction of endowments in profit maximizing economies, cannot be considered to be a 
corollary of a much more general phenomenon. What is further noticeable about the 
present analysis, is that the possibility of being able to manipulate efficient and 
individually rational extended allocations via withholding of endowments and the 
possibility of a similar manipulation via unilateral misrepresentation of preference (see 
Moulin (1995), Lemma 3.8 for an exact statement of the result and its and proof), persists 
even if agents are profit maximizers and also if the non-monetary good that is being 
traded is indivisible, provided the extended allocation does not correspond to a dictatorial 
extended allocation such as the ones discussed above. The implication of such 
manipulations as we observe in this analysis, is the distinct possibility of the dictatorial 
extended allocation being realized. Hence, the vulnerability of the market mechanism to 
manipulation is definitely more real than merely academic in the present context. Thus 
the pedagogic contribution of this analysis, lies in being able to convey a considerable 
amount of economic theory concerned with the strategic behavior of individual agents 
but, using simple demand and supply curves, instead of an Edgeworth box diagram.  
Being able to improve oneself by destroying a portion of one’s initial endowment is 
clearly a “moral hazard” problem. Being able to improve oneself by withholding a 
portion of one’s initial endowment, is akin to what one observes in tax evasion. It appears 
as though, market and or competitive equilibria possess some of the drawbacks of 
insurance schemes and taxation. One may therefore be tempted to conclude that the 
institution of free market serves the dual purpose of insuring an agent against risk, as well 
as achieving a more equitable distribution of resources, making additional risk insurance 
superfluous and public policy interventions an undesirable add-on. While there may be 
striking similarities between the consequences of a market mechanism and public policy 
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market mechanism is a credible substitute for risk insurance companies or public policy 
initiatives for that matter. On the contrary, our results point to the requirement of vigilant 
policing of the market mechanism by the government, the cost of which can only be 
recovered through adequate taxation. It also suggests that a purely trading mechanism 
needs to be supplemented by institutions that guarantee financial compensation against 
risk.  
 
2. The Model: In this section we develop the general equilibrium model with inputs being 
perfectly divisible.  
Consider an economy with H > 0 agents and L + 1 > 1 commodities. The first L 
commodities are used as inputs to produce the L+1
th commodity, which is a numeraire 
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While this need not be the case for a more general statement of the model, for the 









An input consumption of agent i is denoted by an L-vector X
i ≥ 0. 
A price vector p is an element of  \{0}, where for j = 1,…,L, p
L
+ ℜ j denotes the price of 
input j. Clearly a price vector does not allow all inputs to be available for free. 







Note: If for some i∈{1,…,H}, f
i exhibits constant returns to scale, then a maximum profit 
if it exists for i, must be zero. 
 
An allocation is an array X = <X
i/ i = 1,…,H> such that X
i∈  for all i = 1,…,H. 
L
+ ℜ
An allocation X = <X






A market equilibrium is a pair <p*,X*> where p* is a price vector and for all i = 1,…,H, 
X*
i maximizes profits for agent i. 
 
Observation due to Konstantin Makralov: Given a price-allocation pair <p*,X*>: [for 
all i = 1,…,H, X*
i maximizes profits for agent i] if and only if [X* maximizes aggregate 
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1,…,H> is any allocation]. 
 
Hence, a market equilibrium can alternatively be defined as a price-allocation pair 
<p*,X*> such that X* is a feasible allocation and maximizes aggregate profits at p*.  
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i/i = 1,…,H> is said to be efficient if   ≥ 
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i/ i = 1,…,H> is any feasible allocation. 
 
Proposition 1: Let <p*,X*> be a market equilibrium. Then X* is an efficient allocation. 
 
Proof: Let X = <X
i/i = 1,…,H> be any feasible allocation. Since <p*,X*> is a 
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Hence, X* is efficient. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 2: Let <p*,X*> be a market equilibrium and let X be an efficient allocation f. 
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Since X is efficient, it must be the case that ∑
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i i X f ) * (=   ∑
∈I i
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∈I i
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i for all i∈I. 
Thus, <p*,X> is also a market equilibrium.  
Q.E.D. 
 
3. Competitive Equilibria and Market Equilibria: An extended allocation is a pair (X,Y), 
where X is an allocation and Y is an H-vector of real numbers. The i
th component of Y, 
denoted Y
i is the amount of the numeraire consumption good allocated to agent i. 








A feasible extended allocation (X,Y) is said to be efficient if X is an efficient allocation. 







  6Let (X*,Y*) be a efficient extended allocation such that for some i∈{1,…,H}: Y*
i = 









k) for k ≠ i.  
In this extended allocation, agent i, receives the entire output that is produced from X* 
and pays the other agents the output that each could have produced from its initial 
endowment. 
Clearly (X*,Y*) is individually rational as well. Further, agent i, can do no better than at 
(X*,Y*), and given the weak monotonicity assumption of the production functions, at 
(X*,Y*) agent i does not stand to gain by destroying any of its initial endowment either. 
Further, since any agent k(≠i) receives the output that it can produce by using its own 
initial endowments, and hence given the weak monotonicity of the production functions, 
cannot benefit by destroying its own initial endowment. 
 
A feasible extended allocation (X*,Y*) is said to be competitive if there exists a price 












i (the budget constraint of agent i). 
The pair <p*, (X*,Y*)> is then called a competitive equilibrium. 
 






i (i.e. the budget constraint of each agent is satisfied with equality). In the absence 
of equality, an agent could consume more of the consumption good, leading to an 
improvement for itself. 
 
Theorem 1: <p*, (X*,Y*)> is a competitive equilibrium if and only if <p*, X*> is a 
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Hence, for all i = 1,…,H: X*






Thus, <p*,X*> is a market equilibrium. 





i) for all i = 1,…,H. The feasibility of X* guarantees that the extended allocation 
(X*,Y*) is feasible. 
Towards a contradiction suppose that there exists i ∈{1,…,H} and (X
i,Y







































i, contradicting the assumption that <p*,X*> is a 
market equilibrium. 
Thus, <p*, (X*,Y*)> is a competitive equilibrium.  
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i is the value that accrues to agent i, at <p*, X*>. Let S be a non-empty subset 
of {1,…,H} and for i∈S, let X
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This shows that the total value accruing to agents in S at a market equilibrium is at least 
at much as they could generate for themselves by simply using their own resources. Thus, 
the pay-offs to the agents at a market equilibrium belong to the transferable utility core of 
the underlying market game as in Shapley and Shubik (1969, 1976), thereby establishing 
that the set of core allocations are non-empty. 
 
4. Manipulation via endowments:  
Example 1: Let f: ℜ+→ℜ be a function defined as follows for positive real numbers a, b 
and positive integer K where a > (K+1) b and K ≥ 2: 
For all x = [0,K-1] let f(x) = ax; for x ≥ K - 1, let f(x) = (K-1)a + b(x-K + 1). 
Clearly, f is concave.  
Consider an economy with L = 1 and H = 2. Let f
i = f for i = 1,2, w
1 = 2K and w
2 = 0. 
Thus, w = 2K. 
Let p* = b. 
Let X* = <X*
i/ i = 1,2> where K+1 ≥ X*
i ≥ K -1 for i = 1,2 and X*
1 + X*
2 = 2K. 
Clearly <p*,X*> is a market equilibrium and <p*,X*> is a market equilibrium if and 
only if it satisfies the above properties. 




1 + 2Kb = (K-1)a + b(X*
1 - K+1) – X*
1b+ 2Kb = (a + b)K – (a – b).  




2 = (K-1)a + b(X*
2 - K+1) – X*
2b = (a – b)(K-1). 
Now suppose agent 1 destroys half its endowments so that its new initial endowment is 
1
w  = K. Let agent 2’s initial endowment remain unchanged. 
Let  p = a.  
Let  X = <
i
X / i = 1,2> where K - 1 ≥
i




X = K.  
< p , X > is a market equilibrium for the economy with aggregate endowments being K. 
In fact < p , X > is a market equilibrium for the economy with aggregate endowments 
being K, if and only if it satisfies these properties. 
The value accruing to agent 1 in units of the numeraire consumption good at < p , X > is 
a
1
X  – a
1
X  + Ka = Ka > (a + b)K – (a – b), since a > b(K + 1).  





X  = 0.  
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Further, if agent 1 had withheld half its endowment instead of destroying it, then the 
value that accrues to agent 1 in units of the numeraire consumption good at < p , X > is 
a(K-1) + (K + 
1
X - K + 1)b - a
1
X + aK = 2aK - (a – b) (
1
X +1) > 2aK > (a + b)K – (a – 
b), since in this situation agent 1 gets to use 3 units of the input for production. 
This example clearly reveals that agent 1 benefits by destroying half its initial 
endowments, and considerably more by withholding it. 
Discussion of Example 1: (a) In Example 1, the maximum in units of the numeraire 
consumption good that agent 1 can get corresponding to the original initial allocation 
profile is 2a(K-1) + 2b whereas, after destroying half its initial endowments, at any 
individually rational and efficient extended allocation it achieves Ka units of the 
numeraire consumption good. Agent 1 achieves this maximum by withholding half its 
initial endowment. 
(b) In Example 1, if agent 1 instead of revealing the production function f, had 
misrepresented its productivity by revealing the production function g: ℜ+→ℜ where 
g(x) = ax; for x ≥ 0, then there exists a competitive extended allocation after 
misrepresentation, at which it could assure for itself 2a(K-1) + 2b units of the numeraire 
consumption good. 
Thus, Example 1 is an instance of a very simple economy, where every competitive 
extended allocation is vulnerable to manipulation via both misrepresentation of 
productive capabilities as well as destruction or withholding of endowments. 
We now provide another example of manipulation via endowments using a two input 
production function exhibiting constant returns to scale. This function is available in 
Campbell (1987). 
Example 2: As in Campbell (1987), let f:  → ℜ  be a function defined as follows: 
2
+ ℜ
For all x = (x1,x2) ∈ : (a) x
2
+ ℜ 2 ≤ 
3
2
x1 implies f(x) = x1 + 8x2; (b) x2 ≥ 
3
2
x1 implies f(x) = 
5
19
(x1 + x2). 
Clearly, f(0) = 0. 
Let x = (x1,x2), y = (y1,y2)∈  and α∈[0,1]. Let z = (z
2
+ ℜ 1,z2) = αy + (1-α)x. 
If x2 ≤ 
3
2
x1 and y2 ≤ 
3
2




Thus, f(z) = z1 + 8z2 = (αy1 + (1-α)x1) + 8(αy2 + (1-α)x2) = α[y1 + 8y2] + (1-α)[x1 + 8x2] 
= αf(y) + (1-α) f(x). 
If x2 ≥ 
3
2
x1 and y2 ≥ 
3
2




Thus, f(z) = 
5
19
(z1 + z2) = 
5
19
 (αy1 + (1-α)x1) + 
5
19
 (αy2 + (1-α)x2) = α[
5
19




(x1 + x2)] = αf(y) + (1-α) f(x). 
Hence suppose x2 ≥ 
3
2
x1 and y2 ≤ 
3
2
y1. Thus, f(x) = 
5
19
(x1 + x2) and f(y) = (y1 + 8y2). 




Thus, αy2 + (1-α)x2 ≤ 
3
2
[αy1 + (1-α)x1] and f(z) = z1 + 8z2 = [αy1 + (1-α)x1] + 8[αy2 + 
(1-α)x2]. 
Further, f(z) – (1-α)f(x) - αf(y) = [αy1 + (1-α)x1] + 8[αy2 + (1-α)x2] – (1-α) 
5
19
(x1 + x2) 
- α(y1 + 8y2) = (1-α)[(x1+8x2) - 
5
19








) 1 ( 7 α −
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Thus, αy2 + (1-α)x2 ≥ 
3
2
[αy1 + (1-α)x1] and f(z) = 
5
19
 (z1 + z2) = 
5
19
 ([αy1 + (1-α)x1] + 
[αy2 + (1-α)x2]). 
Further, f(z) – (1-α)f(x) - αf(y) = 
5
19




x2) - α(y1 + 8y2) = α[
5
19
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5
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[2x1 – 3x2] ≥ 0, 




Thus, f is concave. Also observe that f exhibits constant returns to scale. 
 
Consider an economy with L = 2 and H = 2. Let f
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<p*,X*> is a market equilibrium. 
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2 = 8. 
Now suppose agent 1 destroys half its endowments so that its new initial endowment is 
1
w  = (1,0)
T. Let agent 2’s initial endowment remain unchanged. 
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i X 2
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i X 2 5
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T for i = 1,2.  
< p , X > is a market equilibrium for the economy with aggregate endowments being 
(1,1)
T. 
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> 2.  




X ) –  p
T 2





< 8.  
Thus, agent 1 is better off after having destroyed half its endowment. 
Further, if agent 1 had withheld half its endowment instead of destroying it, then the 





X  +  p
T 1



















units of the first and 
2
1
units of the second for production. 
In the above, the equilibrium prices prescribed by Campbell (1987) and that are realized 
after agent 1 destroys or withholds half its endowments, had to be calibrated in order to 
yield profit maximizing solutions. With the price of both inputs being one as in Campbell 
(1987), a market equilibrium would clearly not exist. 
This example again reveals that agent 1 benefits by destroying half its initial 
endowments, and considerably more by withholding it. 
 
5. Discrete Concave Market Games: We now develop the general equilibrium model for 
the case where the inputs are available in integer amount only. 
Let N = א∪{0}, where א denotes the set of natural numbers. As before let there be H > 0 
agents and L+1 > 1 commodities. The first L commodities are used as inputs to produce 
the L+1
th commodity, which is a numeraire consumption good. Each agent i is initially 
endowed with a commodity bundle w(i)∈N
L. Let ‘w’ denote the initial endowment 
function.  









For j = 1,…,L, let wj =  , i.e. the aggregate amount of commodity j that is 
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L→ℜ is said to be monotonically non-decreasing if for all x,y∈N
L: x ≥ y 
implies  f(x) ≥ f(y). 
A function f: N
L →ℜ is said to be discrete concave if there exists a continuous concave 
function g: → ℜ  such that the restriction of g to N
L
+ ℜ
L coincides with f. 
Given functions f: N
L →ℜ and g: → ℜ , let graph(f) ≡ {(x, α)∈N
L
+ ℜ
L×ℜ/ α ≤ f(x)} and 
graph(g) ≡ {(x, α)∈ × ℜ / α ≤ g(x)}. 
L
+ ℜ
Given a function f: N
L →ℜ its canonical extension is the function g




f) = convex hull of graph(f).  
If f is discrete concave, then its canonical extension g
f is continuous and concave and the 
restriction of g
f to N
L coincides with f. 
Each agent i has preferences defined over N
L which is representable by a monotonically 
non-decreasing discrete concave production function f
i.  
The pair <{f
i/i= 1,…,H}, w> is called a discrete concave market game.  
An input consumption vector of agent i is denoted by a vector X
i ∈N
L. 
A price vector p is an element of  \{0}, where for j = 1,…,L, p
L
+ ℜ j denotes the price of 
input j. 






An allocation is an array X = <X
i/ i = 1,…,H> such that X
i∈N
L for all i = 1,…,H. 
An allocation X = <X












A market equilibrium is a pair <p*,X*> where p* is a price vector and for all i = 1,…,H, 
X*
i maximizes profits for agent i. 
Similar problems have been studied by Yang (2001), Sun and Yang (2004) and Inoue 
(2005). The case where wj = 1 for j = 1,…,L has been investigated by Bhikchandani and 
Mamer (1997). 
For j = 1,…,L, let ej denote the j
th unit coordinate vector in ℜ
L. Market equilibrium in the 
Shapley and Shubik (1972) assignment game is related to the case where: 
(a) wj = 1 for all j = 1,…,L; and  
(b) for all i = 1,…,H and x ∈ N






i(x) = max {f
i(ej)/ xj > 0}]. 
A feasible allocation X*  = <X*
i/i = 1,…,H> is said to be efficient if   ≥ 












i i X f
1
) (
i/ i = 1,…,H> is any feasible allocation. 
 
A replication of the proof of Proposition 1 yields the following: 
 
Proposition 3: Let <p*,X*> be a market equilibrium. Then X* is an efficient allocation. 
 
A replication of the proof of Proposition 2 yields the following:  
 
  12Proposition 4: Let <p*,X*> be a market equilibrium and let X be an efficient allocation f. 
Then, <p*,X> is also a market equilibrium. 
 
An extended allocation is a pair (X,Y), where X is an allocation and Y is an H-vector of 
real numbers. The i
th component of Y, denoted Y
i is the amount of the numeraire 
consumption good allocated to agent i. 
An extended allocation (X,Y) is said to be feasible if X is a feasible allocation and 






A feasible extended allocation (X*,Y*) is said to be competitive if there exists a price 












i (the budget constraint of agent i). 
The pair <p*, (X*,Y*)> is then called a competitive equilibrium. 
 






i (i.e. the budget constraint of each agent is satisfied with equality). In the absence 
of equality, an agent could consume more of the consumption good, leading to an 
improvement for itself. 
 
The proof of the following theorem is identical to the proof of Theorem 1. 
 
Theorem 2: <p*, (X*,Y*)> is a competitive equilibrium if and only if <p*, X*> is a 




i) for all i = 1,…,H. 
 
6. Manipulation via endowments for discrete concave market games:  
Example 3: Consider the discrete concave market game <{f
i/i= 1,2}, w> with L = 1, w
1 = 
8, w
2 = 0 and where each f
i is the restriction to N of the function f: ℜ →ℜ defined in 
Example 1 of section 4. 
It is easily observed that <p*,X*> is a market equilibrium, where p* = b, 5 ≥ X*
i ≥ 3 for i 
= 1,2 and X*
1 + X*
2 = 8. 
Now suppose agent 1 destroys half its endowments. Then its profits increase.  
Thus, agent 1 is better off after having destroyed half its endowment. 
Further, if agent 1 had withheld half its endowment instead of destroying it, then its 
profits increase even further. 
Example 4: Consider the discrete concave market game <{f




2 = (0,10) and where each f
i is the restriction to N
2 of the function f: → ℜ  
defined in Example 2 of section 4. 
2
+ ℜ














1 = 20.  







2 = 80. 
  13Now suppose agent 1 destroys half its endowments so that its new initial endowment is 
1
w  = (10,0)
T. Let agent 2’s initial endowment remain unchanged. 







T and  X = <
i
X / i = 1,2> where 
i
X = (5,5)
T for i = 1,2.  
< p , X > is a market equilibrium for the economy with aggregate endowments being 
(10,10)
T. 




X ) – p
T 1
X  +  p
 T 1
w  = 38 > 20.  




X ) –  p
T 2
X  +  p
Tw
2 = 38 < 80.  
Thus, agent 1 is better off after having destroyed half its endowment. 
Further, if agent 1 had withheld half its endowment instead of destroying it, then the 
value that accrues to agent 1 in units of the numeraire consumption good at < p , X > is 
55 –  p
T 1
X  +  p
T 1
w  = 55-38 + 38= 55 > 38 > 20, since in this situation agent 1 gets to 
use 15 units of the first and 5 units of the second for production. 
 
7. Conclusion: The essence of Theorems 1 and 2 is that market equilibrium and 
competitive equilibrium are equivalent concepts. Thus in a market economy such as the 
one modeled above, there is no difference between assuming agents to be profit 
maximizers or as maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint. However, unlike a 
Walrasian equilibrium with quasi-linear utilities, we do not impose the requirement that 
consumption of the numeraire good has to be non-negative. 
It is instructive to note that in our model, the set of market equilibria while being 
dependent on the aggregate initial endowment of the inputs w, is completely independent 
of the particular initial distribution of it among the agents, i.e. the array <w
i/i=1,…,H> 
itself. Thus two different initial distributions among the agents of the same aggregate 
initial endowment, leads to the same set of market equilibria. However, what changes 
along with a change in the initial endowment of an agent, is its final worth measured in 
terms of the numeraire consumption good. 
If  <w
i/i=1,…,H> is the array depicting the initial endowments of the agents, then 
corresponding to the market equilibria <p*,X*>, the final consumption of the numeraire 





i). Thus if t: {1,…H}→ℜ
L with 
= 0 is a function that, specifies a redistribution of the initial endowment among the 













i). The consequent change in welfare measured in units of the numeraire consumption 
good for agent i, is p*













) ( . Thus, a 
redistribution of the initial endowment among the agents, leads to a redistribution of the 
aggregate final output of the consumption good among the agents. Hence, phenomena 
akin to the “transfer paradox” are ruled out in our setting.  
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